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Abstract
The Internet today is made up of large networks known as autonomous systems (AS). These
networks are given ownership over static blocks of IP prefixes, which they announce using the border
gateway protocol (BGP). These static mappings of IP prefixes to ASes are well known and publicly
available. This makes it easy for individuals, corporations, and governments to target specific entities
for traﬃc analysis. This thesis describes traﬃc analysis in terms three scopes of trust, discussing
the risks and requirements at each level. It then looks at traﬃc captured at Clemson University,
showing how much information is actually made available through packet header information. It
then proposes a Traﬃc Analysis Resistant Network (TARN), with varying network architectures to
deal with the diﬀerent scopes of trust. A TARN prototype was constructed and evaluated using
the GENI and PEERING testbeds. This thesis then discusses the results of the evaluation, showing
that TARN is a feasible solution to the vulnerabilities caused due to static IP prefix allocations.
Finally, it considers future deployments, discussing potential scalability concerns of a large TARN
deployment.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
For nearly 30 years, the Internet, considered one of the greatest inventions since the printing
press, has provided users a place to share information, express their views, and communicate in a
way that has completely transformed the world as we knew it. The rise of the Internet has been
the catalyst to what is now known as the Information Age, providing unprecedented innovations in
information storage, transmission, and computation. The benefits are obvious, but this newfound
deluge of data opens the floodgates for potentially unwanted analysis. Thankfully, through the use
of encryption on much of our data, our privacy is kept relatively safe. But the Internet was not
designed for anonymity. And users today, mostly unknowingly, are feeling the eﬀects.
Routing with BGP in the Internet core is built on the fundamental assumption of trust.
There is trust that an AS will only act in accordance with its registration; only advertising the IP
prefixes that it owns. This flawed assumption leaves BGP susceptible to something known as BGP
hijacking. There are many examples of BGP hijacking, both accidental and intentional. These will
be discussed in depth in Section 2.1. By taking advantage of vulnerabilities in BGP, it is possible
to covertly steer Internet traﬃc at will. This opens the door to widespread, targeted traﬃc analysis
at an enormous scale.
Traﬃc analysis is an unfortunate reality for most, if not all, Internet users. The perpetrators
can range in size from individual criminals attempting to scrape login information at a local Starbucks, to national governments, like China, who want to define what information is inappropriate,
and therefore inaccessible, for its citizens.
Numerous solutions have been proposed to protect the core of the Internet, namely in
1

regards to BGP. These solutions attempt to tackle the problem of authentication and authorization
providing a way to enforce autonomous systems to prove that they are who they claim to be and
that they own the IP prefixes that they claim to own. Given the complexity of the BGP protocol
and of AS peering agreements, not to mention the fact that network operators are hesitant to make
significant changes to such critical infrastructure, these solutions have seen very little adoption [22].
Again, these solutions only attempt to solve BGPs trust issues, still leaving some types of
attacks diﬃcult to combat. These attacks are rooted in the core assumption that IP prefixes are
statically and publicly tied to autonomous systems.
This thesis proposes a novel Internet architecture that decouples IP prefixes from an AS,
making it diﬃcult for attackers to maintain their sights on a specific target when performing traﬃc
analysis.

1.1

Organization
In Chapter 2 we provide an overview of the Internet architecture, along with the protocols

used to route traﬃc through it. We also give an overview of traﬃc analysis – what it is and why it
is used. Finally, we discuss diﬀerent methods of circumventing traﬃc analysis.
In Chapter 3 we discuss anonymity as it relates to network users. We describe three scopes of
trust within a network, including how traﬃc analysis may be performed at each level. We also discuss
an intrinsic problem with networks today and how it aﬀects traﬃc analysis. A characterization of
network traﬃc collected at Clemson University is then performed and examined.
In Chapter 4 we introduce TARN, a traﬃc analysis resistant architecture that eliminates
the coupling of IP prefixes and addresses with networks and hosts. We discuss the diﬀerent deployment scenarios as they are designed to operate within the multiple scopes of trust. The software
architecture of TARN is introduced. Finally, we look at a couple of real-world deployments of a
TARN proof-of-concept.
In Chapter 5 we discuss the potential scalability tradeoﬀs and bottlenecks in various TARN
deployments. We then take a look at some basic throughput testing performed using the TARN
deployment within the GENI and PEERING testbeds.
In Chapter 6 we make our final conclusions about TARN and discuss potential areas of
future work.
2

Chapter 2

Background and Related Work
2.1

Background
The Internet today consists mainly of large, independent networks known as autonomous

systems (AS). These autonomous systems are typically associated with a company, organization,
university, etc. The owners of an autonomous system are wholly responsible for its operation,
security, and the networking of hosts within the AS. Each AS, in order to connect to other ASes
within the Internet, will have at least one gateway for network traﬃc entering or leaving the AS.
In order to distinguish between autonomous systems, a numbering system is used, with each
autonomous system maintaining an associated number. These autonomous system numbers (ASN)
are maintained by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), with the IANA allocating
blocks of these ASNs to regional Internet registries (RIR). Each autonomous system must be registered with one of these authorities to receive the required ASN. Each ASN is globally unique and
only associated with a single autonomous system. As an example, the New York Times owns ASNs
4543, 21568, and 40833, while the Washington Post owns ASN 30281.
Each autonomous system, in addition to a globally unique ASN, will also register for and
be assigned globally unique blocks of IP prefixes. These blocks of IP addresses are then used to
address hosts within the AS. Because each IP prefix associated with the AS is unique to the AS,
each IP address is globally unique, which forms part of the foundation for global routing between
hosts. Using our previous examples, the New York Times ASN 40833 has the associated IP prefix
170.149.238.0/23. The Washington Post ASN 30281 has the associated IP prefix 198.72.14.0/23.
3

Networking between autonomous systems is made possible by a global routing table, built
using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Each autonomous system will have at least one BGP
router. This router has two main functions: announcing route information to BGP neighbors and
receiving route information from BGP neighbors.
With any type of configuration, there are bound to be mistakes. This is especially true for a
protocol as complicated as BGP. Within BGP, these mistakes can be leveraged by malicious actors
in order to divert network traﬃc through a compromised path. This type of attack is known as BGP
hijacking. BGP hijacking consists of a malicious AS (AS1) announcing an IP prefix that is actually
owned by a diﬀerent AS (AS2). This announcement forces some Internet traﬃc destined for AS2 to
be routed to AS1 instead.
BGP hijacking is a constant threat and is typically carried out by nation-states that have
control over large ISPs. In February of 2008, Pakistan Telecom, in an attempt to block access to
Youtube for hosting anti-Islamic content, advertised a more specific route to a portion of YouTube’s
IP prefix. This advertisement resulted in most BGP routers forwarding traﬃc intended for YouTube
to Pakistan Telecom instead, where it was subsequently black-holed.
Part of the danger of BGP hijacking is in its ability to go unnoticed, even for years at a
time. Often, the most dangerous attacks are the most well-coordinated, disguising criminal activity
as business activity. A prime example of this behavior was found in 2018, when it was determined
that, since the early 2000’s, China Telecom has been strategically placing BGP points of presence
(PoPs) around the United States and Canada in order to eﬃciently perform BGP hijacking on a
broadscale [19].
For our purposes, the specificity of each hijacking attempt is particularly interesting. In the
case of Pakistan Telecom, YouTube traﬃc was targeted. In the case of China Telecom, there were
a myriad of targets: government organizations, news organizations, banks, and financial companies.
Network traﬃc from these specific sectors is typically highly sensitive, making it very valuable to a
malicious actor capable of mining information from the data rich packets. By hijacking this traﬃc,
these attackers are able to insert themselves in between the source and destination, paving the way
for man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, collection of sensitive data, encryption attacks, or simply
denial of service (DOS).

4

2.1.1

Border Gateway Protocol
In today’s Internet, routing is done on a global scale, between autonomous systems (AS)

using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). In a BGP network, a BGP speaker will communicate
network reachability information to its neighboring BGP speakers. These neighboring BGP speakers
will then communicate all learned network reachability information with their neighbors, and the
process will continue until convergence is reached.
The network reachability information that is advertised with BGP includes the list of ASes
that must be traversed. As BGP updates are propagated from one BGP speaker to the next, each
speaker will append its own AS to the list. This path vector approach allows routing loops to be
avoided, and policy decisions, configured by network administrators, to be enforced.
With the introduction of BGP-4 came support for Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR).
The addition of CIDR support allowed for BGP speakers to announce a set of destinations as IP
prefixes; both IPv4 and IPv6.
BGP UPDATE messages are responsible for the transfer of network reachability information.
A BGP UPDATE consists of three main components: the network layer reachability information,
the path attributes, and the withdrawn routes. For each AS path being advertised, a single BGP
UPDATE message will be sent. Although the message will only consist of a single AS path, multiple
prefixes may be advertised in the message. In other words, a single BGP UPDATE may only
advertise a single route. However, a single BGP UPDATE may withdraw multiple routes. These
withdrawn routes are identified using each IP prefix.
BGP is the de-facto standard for inter-AS routing, and its usage is increasing at a nearly
exponential rate. As an example, the BGP forwarding table (FIB) crossed 100,000 active entries in
the year 2001. In the year 2018, it crossed 800,000 active entries.

2.2

Related Work
When avoiding traﬃc analysis as an Internet user, the simplest method is to use a single-hop

proxy. These proxies encrypt web traﬃc and obfuscate the real destination, relying instead on the
destination address of the proxy. Two of the most popular solutions, Lantern and Psiphon [5, 7],
have arisen to fill this need. While these web proxies are successful at bypassing existing censorship
circumvention techniques, these solutions are careful not to claim any ability to provide anonymity
5

when using the tool. These tools, only focused on providing uncensored access to Internet content,
are sometimes only active when a website or resource is blocked. This opens the door to a myriad
of potential attacks.
While proxies typically only deal with web traﬃc, VPNs encrypt all traﬃc. By encrypting
all traﬃc instead of just a certain kind, this prevents attacks that rely on leakage of side-channel
information. These VPN solutions are not perfect. Side-channel features like traﬃc rates and delays
can be used to learn sensitive information from encrypted traﬃc [13, 38]. Further, an often used
marketing strategy for companies providing VPN services is the assurance that no connection logs
are maintained, in an eﬀort to fully maintain user privacy. However, VPN companies are often faced
with the decision of handing over connection logs or facing federal charges. As shown in [37], it is
no guarantee that a company is not keeping logs, even if it claims otherwise. This often forces users
to put their trust and, ultimately, their privacy into the hands of their chosen VPN provider.
The known limitations of proxies and VPNs to maintain user anonymity have given rise to
tools that rely on anonymity networks, like Tor [9] and I2P [3]. Tor uses a process known as Onion
Routing to route traﬃc through its crowd sourced anonymity network. Traﬃc is encrypted at least
three times as it jumps between Tor nodes, limiting information about the next hop to only the
current node. While I2P is similar to Tor in a number of ways, its not widely used. There have been
a number of attacks aimed at the anonymity of Tor users [20, 12]. In an eﬀort to mitigate some of
these attacks, Tor uses pluggable transports, which are modular proxies that mask the underlying
protocol. One such example is the Marionette system [21], which has configurable ciphertext formats,
protocol features, and statistical properties.
Moving target defenses (MTD) attempt to limit an attacker’s damage and range by converting traditionally static components into dynamic ones. Network address space randomization is
a technique that modifies DHCP to hand out short-term leases, thereby forcing network hosts to rotate IP addresses at a much higher rate than normal [29]. In [26], this concept has been extended to
utilize software-defined networking instead of DHCP. It describes an OpenFlow-based MTD known
as OpenFlow Random Host Mutation. In this solution, hosts are assigned short lived virtual IP
addresses which are mapped to and from the actual IP address of the host using OpenFlow rules.
These virtual IP addresses are then mutated over time. These solutions are primarily billed as a
deterrent to network scanning of small L3 networks.
Decoy routing [27] attempts to circumvent IP address filtering by deploying devices into the
6

network that can, on a signal, hijack a TCP session and redirect a client to a covert destination. This
action renders the destination IP address eﬀectively meaningless, allowing the client to choose any
destination IP address it needs in order to bypass an adversary. In order for decoy routing to work,
the client must be aware of how to send the necessary signal to a decoy router. This requirement
is met using some sort of software that is installed on any host wanting to participate in decoy
routing.

7

Chapter 3

Anonymity
Maintaining anonymity is a critical piece in the process of resisting traﬃc analysis. In this
chapter, anonymity is defined in Section 3.1 along with a thread model defining the attacker in
question. Traﬃc analysis is discussed in Section 3.2, specifically analysis at a large, country-wide
scale. This is also where we define the separate scopes-of-trust within an AS. Section 3.3 discusses the
relationship between an IP prefix and publicly available “whois” information. Section 3.4 discusses
the rise of CDNs and its eﬀect on IP anonymity. Finally, a data set is introduced in Section 3.5,
where Netflow traﬃc collected from Clemson University is analyzed.

3.1

Defining Anonymity
Anonymity may have slightly diﬀerent meanings to diﬀerent people [34].

At its core,

anonymity is the state in which the actions of some client are separated from the client itself,
for some observer. To put this in networking terms, a network connection is anonymous when it
cannot be traced to the sender or the receiver, depending on the anonymity requirements.
Note the diﬀerence here in regards to privacy. Privacy limits an observer’s knowledge of
some action being performed, while anonymity limits an observer’s knowledge of who is performing
the action.
The authors of [23] introduce a somewhat weak, but useful definition of anonymity that will
be adopted throughout the rest of this work. They define a system as “minimally anonymous” if
an observer does not know if an action has been performed by some client in the system. Note that
8

this only speaks to an observer’s absolute certainty. This can be contrasted with “total anonymity”
in which, from the perspective of the observer, an action could have been performed by any client
in the system, with equal certainty. This is a much stronger definition of anonymity, but not one in
which we are after.
It is possible then, as mentioned in [14], that even when relying on random mechanisms,
a suﬃciently capable observer may be able to determine some probabilistic relationship between
the anonymous clients and some group of observables. There are numerous side-channels that may
be exploited on a network connection, including things like packet sizes, network delay, and the
frequency of communications [16]. This vulnerability is briefly touched on multiple times, but this
is primarily considered to be outside the scope of this work and a future area of research and
qualification.
In the scope of this work, anonymity is defined as the inability of an attacker to determine
a relationship with absolute certainty between a network flow and a client using IP addresses.

3.1.1

Defining the Threat
Throughout this work, we assume a passive attacker who is interested in monitoring what

communication is occurring. It is also assumed that no data is leaked from the message contents.
As for the strength of the attacker, three diﬀerent levels will be used, each representing a more
powerful attacker than the last. The diﬀerent levels of strength correspond to the network visibility
of the attacker. The first level of strength signifies an attacker whose visibility reach is limited to the
inter-IXP level. This means that the attacker has the ability to monitor any traﬃc passing between
IXPs. The second level of strength signifies a more powerful attacker whose visibility reach extends
into the IXP, to the border of the AS. Any traﬃc leaving a given AS is able to be monitored by the
attacker. The third and final level of strength signifies the most powerful attacker, whose visibility
reach extends into the AS. This attacker has the ability to monitor any traﬃc leaving specific hosts
in the network.

3.2

Traﬃc Analysis
Insecurities in BGP routing allows for near global denial-of-service attacks against targeted

services. In February of 2008, Pakistan Telecom was given a government order to block access to
9

YouTube in response to an anti-religious video that was shared on the platform. Pakistan Telecom
devised a plan in which they would advertise a route that corresponded to an IP prefix that was
being used by YouTube eﬀectively masquerading as YouTube themselves. This would allow them
to respond to any YouTube requests by simply dropping them, thereby preventing access. Unfortunately, the route advertised (208.65.153.0/24) was more specific than the route that had been
advertised by the actual YouTube (208.65.152.0/22). Due to the way that BGP route selection
behaves, this route was chosen as the preferred route to YouTube by Pakistan Telecoms upstream
provider, who then advertised the route even further. This led to many of the worlds BGP routers
choosing Pakistan Telecom as the preferred destination when routing YouTube traﬃc. In turn, this
simple routing advertisement created a widespread outage for YouTube[15].

3.2.1

Scopes of Trust
There are many points in a network where traﬃc monitoring and analysis can be performed.

In this paper, we look at three specific locations. Each location lies at the boundary of what we refer
to as a scope of trust. We define a scope of trust as the area not aﬀected by malicious or unwanted
traﬃc analysis. Traﬃc analysis at each scope of trust boundary suﬀers from diﬀerent challenges
and therefore has diﬀerent implications. These diﬀerent scopes of trust are referenced and utilized
further in Section 4.5.
3.2.1.1

Host
In this host-level scope of trust, the network beyond a given host is untrusted, and it is

assumed that traﬃc analysis is being performed at that location. This scope of trust is the most
restrictive of the three, but, given the limited amount of traﬃc capable of leaving a single host, more
sophisticated forms of traﬃc analysis may be performed. Any user within a local or campus network
that is performing unwanted traﬃc analysis is forced within this scope of trust.
3.2.1.2

Network Gateway
The network gateway scope of trust implies that malicious or unwanted traﬃc analysis is

being performed on any traﬃc leaving the network in question.
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3.2.1.3

Internet Exchange Point
The IXP scope of trust implies that malicious or unwanted traﬃc analysis is being performed

on traﬃc within a given IXP. This means that the autonomous system in question that peers at the
IXP is considered trusted.

3.2.2

Traﬃc Analysis Outside Scopes of Trust
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, traﬃc analysis challenges, depending on the location in which

it is being performed, can vary widely. In relatively small, low-bandwidth networks, it is possible
to employ traﬃc analysis tools which look at an entire packet. This type of analysis can reveal a
great deal of information. However, there are storage and compute tradeoﬀs that must be considered
when performing a full packet analysis.
As an example, at the time of writing, two of the largest internet exchange points, AMS-IX
and DE-CIX, are averaging over 3.7 Tbps and 4.2 Tbps in network traﬃc each day [1, 2]. Internet2,
the operator of one of the largest research and education networks in the United States, has a
100Gbps backbone, with 317 higher education members [4]. This amount of traﬃc exceeds some of
the physical limitations present when storing and analyzing each packet. In order to compensate
for such bandwidth requirements while still providing certain traﬃc analysis capabilities, flow-based
analysis tools were created. The most popular of these tools are Netflow and sFlow.
Netflow

Netflow, created by Cisco Systems, is one of the most popular flow-based analysis tools in

use. In a Netflow system, network elements known as exporters, such as routers and switches, gather
IP flow information and export it to another node, known as the Netflow collector. The Netflow
collector is responsible for receiving flow data from one or more exporters, parsing the flow data, and
finally storing the flow records. It should be emphasized that Netflow captures information about
IP flows and stores this information as flow records. An IP flow is simply a unidirectional set of IP
packets that share a set of common properties, determined from the packet header. A flow record
provides information about a particular IP flow [17].
Netflow supports a variety of fields that can be stored in flow records, although not all of
these fields are guaranteed to be implemented by a given Netflow exporter. Supported fields include,
but are not limited to, bytes in, packets in, source IP, destination IP, source port, destination port,
protocol, TCP flags, source MAC, destination MAC, source VLAN, destination VLAN, etc.
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Using Netflow yields much better performance than traditional full-packet analysis, however,
in very high bandwidth situations, it is still too costly. Standard Netflow requires all IP packets on
an interface to be processed, which is not always feasible. To remedy this, sampled Netflow is used.
Sampled Netflow specifies that only a sample of IP packets are exported to the collector, which
reduces the computational overhead of traditional Netflow. There are two main types of sampling
mechanisms: deterministic and random sampled. In Deterministic Netflow, one out of every n
packets is sampled. In Random Sampled Netflow, one packet is sampled amongst an interval of n
packets.
sFlow

sFlow is another very popular traﬃc analysis tool, used frequently in high speed network

environments. An sFlow deployment consists primarily of sFlow agents and a central sFlow collector.
The sFlow agents are implemented in network devices, such as switches and routers. The agents
are responsible for sampling network traﬃc, collecting traﬃc statistics and sending these statistics
to the collector in the form of an sFlow datagram. The collector is responsible for analyzing any
datagrams received [30].
Netflow vs. sFlow

While similar in name, sFlow has a few major diﬀerences from its Netflow

counterpart. To start, sFlow is a stateless packet sampling protocol. Packet sampling in sFlow is
mandatory, unlike Netflow, where packet sampling is possible, but not mandatory. The sFlow agent
is typically embedded in the ASIC of a network device, which reduces the strain of traﬃc sampling
in high speed networks. Netflow, on the other hand, requires exporters to maintain a flow cache,
which invokes the CPU and RAM of the device. Although its name contains the word flow, sFlow
does not aggregate packet samples into the abstract flow grouping in the way that Netflow does.
This gives sFlow the freedom to sample any types of packets, from L2 to L7. A side-eﬀect of this
approach is that a single IP flow may be sampled multiple times, each sample creating a new sFlow
record, whereas Netflow will only create two records for the same IP flow.
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3.3

The Hinge Point: Autonomous System and IP Prefix
Coupling

3.3.1

Narrowing the Scope
When discussing traﬃc analysis, there are many factors that can be considered. Analysis

can be done based on packet header information. This can include source and destination IP
addresses, source and destination MAC addresses, TCP ports, IP protocols, etc. Analysis can also
be performed based on the packet’s payload using deep packet inspection (DPI). Traﬃc analysis can
be done based on other features like packet timings, packet size, and so on. Given the many forms of
traﬃc analysis, it is very diﬃcult to discuss every possible scenario, method, and caveat. With this
in mind, we will begin to narrow our discussion of traﬃc analysis and anonymity to the IP layer.

3.3.2

Registration Systems
The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is the ultimate authority over IP ad-

dress allocation and autonomous system number allocation. More broadly, it is responsible for the
assignment of Internet numbers. For IP addresses in particular, the IANA further delegates the
responsibility of resource allocation to regional Internet registries (RIRs).
There are five RIRs that manage the allocation and delegation of Internet resources throughout the world. The African Network Information Center (AFRINIC) is responsible for Africa. The
Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre (APNIC) is responsible for East Asia, Oceania, South Asia,
and Southeast Asia. The American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) is responsible for Antarctica, Canada, parts of the Caribbean, and the United States. The Latin America and Caribbean
Network Information Centre (LACNIC) is responsible for parts of the Caribbean and all of Latin
America. The Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC) is responsible for
Europe, Central Asia, Russia, and West Asia. RIRs further delegate IP address ranges to local
Internet registries (LIRs) and Internet service providers (ISPs).
Each RIR manages the assignment of autonomous system numbers (ASNs). ASNs may be
requested by users with a multi-homed network or unique routing requirements. Typically, some
type of yearly payment will be made for the ASN allocation. When an ASN is allocated, it is
allocated alongside an AS name. This information is publicly available [11].
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As mentioned previously, IP prefix allocations are managed by the IANA, which then delegates to the RIRs, which then further delegate to LIRs and ISPs. These LIRs and ISPs may either
allocate entire IP prefixes to specific networks, or may only assign IP addresses to users. No matter
how the IP prefix allocations are managed, they must be advertised at some point in order to be
made publicly available. In order for this to occur, each prefix must first be associated with an ASN.

3.3.3

Connecting the Dots
ASN allocations, as mentioned, are made available from their respective RIRs. ASNs are

globally unique and the allocations are unlikely to change, which makes it easier to provide this
information. On the other hand, IP prefix allocations are much harder to track. This information,
however, is vitally important when it comes to traﬃc analysis. The ability to correlate an IP prefix
with the autonomous system it has been allocated to is the hinge point to yielding significant amounts
of useful information.
IP prefixes, in order to be publicly reachable, must be advertised in some fashion. The de
facto standard for prefix advertisement between autonomous systems is the BGP protocol. When
an autonomous system advertises an IP prefix using BGP, it also includes its assigned ASN. As this
advertisement is propagated around the world, each BGP router will append its own ASN to the
advertisement, building a full path of ASNs back to the AS which originally advertised the prefix.
IP prefix advertisements eventually converge, resulting in a steady-state BGP routing table.
This routing table is global and should therefore look the same on nearly every BGP router. There
are many tools available that act as a “looking glass” into this global BGP routing table [36].
Using the routing information collected from the BGP routing table, a correlation can be
made between any advertised IP prefix and its associated ASN. This coupling of IP prefixes to
their respective ASNs is a critical piece in performing traﬃc analysis at an AS-level scale. It is the
mapping necessary to convert an IP address into information that degrades anonymity.

3.3.4

WHOIS More Information?
Each RIR maintains a database of registration information that is able to be retrieved

using the registration data access protocol (RDAP) [28]. RDAP is similar in nature to the well
known WHOIS protocol [18]. There is a large amount of information that can be learned from the
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registration information that is returned including the name of the owner of the registration, email
addresses, phone numbers, location information, etc.
From an IP address, using the ASN mapping retrieved from the BGP routing table, the
relevant RIR’s RDAP server can be queried to gain detailed information about the AS associated
with the given IP address. A sample of an example response for AS12148, the Clemson University
AS, can be seen in Listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1: Portion of RDAP Response for AS12148
1

{

2

" handle ": " CUADM - ARIN " ,

3

" vcardArray ": [

4

" vcard " ,

5

[

6

[

7

" adr " ,

8

{
" label ": " Clemson Computing and Information Technology \ r \ n \ r \

9

nClemson University \ nClemson \ nSC \ n29634 \ nUnited States "
10

},

11

" text " ,

12

[
"" , "" , "" , "" , "" , "" , ""

13

]

14

15

],

16

[
" fn " , {} , " text " , " CU - ADMIN - ARIN "

17

18

],

19

[
" org " , {} , " text " , " CU - ADMIN - ARIN "

20

21

],

22

[
" email " , {} , " text " , " CU - ADMIN - ARIN@lists . clemson . edu "

23

24

],

25

[
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26

" tel " ,

27

{

28

" type ": [

29

" work " ,

30

" voice "
]

31

32

},

33

" text " ,

34

"+1 -864 -656 -4634"
]

35

]

36

]

37

38

}

3.4

CDN Usage and IP Anonymity
The rise of content delivery networks (CDNs) and cloud-based hosting services is easy to

notice. It is also evident in our Netflow records. Just looking at the number of flows per organization
in Figure 3.3, Amazon Web Services (AWS) accounts for 4 out of the top 10, while Akamai, a CDN
provider, sits at 5th. It is becoming increasingly more common for websites and services to be hosted
in the public cloud or on some network edge. There are numerous benefits to this approach including
easier scaling, no hardware management, and reduced latency for clients.
An additional, probably unintended benefit to moving workloads and assets to the cloud
and to CDNs is the usage of cloud provider owned IP prefixes. As discussed, the main threat to
IP layer anonymity is the coupling of IP prefixes to organizations. By using a cloud provider’s IP
prefix, there is added diﬃculty in determining what website or resource is being accessed when only
looking at source and destination IP addresses.
In order to illustrate this, a python script was written to collect DNS information about
a series of popular news websites. In this script, a list of URLs was iterated through and DNS
information was collected for each URL. Using the built in python dns library, each URL was
resolved to a list of IP addresses, periodically, every minute. This DNS information was used to
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build a collection of mappings between each URL and corresponding resolved addresses. A subset of
this information can be seen in Table 3.1. Using the IPWHOIS tool on the resolved addresses, it was
determined that for the URLs being requested, three CDN providers were in use: Fastly, Incapsula,
and AWS.
We will now use the New York Times as a concrete example. The New York Times controls
3 autonomous systems with 17 IP prefixes registered among them. Any network traﬃc that includes
an IP address within one of these 17 prefixes is easily traced back to the New York Times organization
using the methods that were illustrated in Section 3.3.4. However, using the information collected in
the DNS queries, we can see that the New York Times has chosen to host their website on an edge
cloud platform, Fastly, as shown in Table 3.1. Let us now assume that some entity is performing
traﬃc analysis on some network traﬃc in an attempt to discover connections to the New York Times.
Because we have limited our scope to flow collection capabilities, the entity is limited in the amount
of information they can retrieve. In this case, traﬃc analysis will only reveal flow records to an
IP address that is owned by Fastly, which hosts many services, including Reddit, Github, Yelp and
more. The traﬃc analysis methods listed previously will not be suﬃcient when trying to correlate
the IP address found in the flow record to the service being used.
We can see now that the rise in CDN usage has made some forms of traﬃc analysis more
diﬃcult. In fact, this is becoming a common problem for network administrators that have relied
on this information in the past in order to manage their network eﬀectively. This has led to new
recommendations in how to counteract these newfound traﬃc analysis limitations. The most common approach is to perform some type of DNS analysis in conjunction with traditional methods,
like Netflow collection.

3.5

Traﬃc Analysis: Clemson University
In order to further understand the capabilities of an autonomous system level attacker,

core campus traﬃc collected by Clemson University’s Cybersecurity Operations Center (CSOC) is
obtained and analyzed. In this section, the Clemson University campus network is described, along
with the NetFlow records that were used in the analysis.
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3.5.1

Clemson University’s Network
Clemson University is a top tier research university with nearly 25,000 undergraduate and

graduate students.
The Clemson University network is a registered autonomous system, with the autonomous
system number AS12148. It contains four assigned IPv4 prefix ranges totaling 98,816 unique addresses: 130.127.0.0/16, 192.42.3.0/24, 192.5.219.0/24, and 198.21.128.0/17. It contains a single
assigned IPv6 prefix range: 2620:103:a000::/44. Every device on the campus network is assigned an
IP address from one of these publicly advertised prefix ranges, meaning no form of network address
translation (NAT) is performed on any ingress or egress traﬃc.
The Clemson University LAN connects to the outside world through a variety of internet
service providers (ISPs) along with a research and education (R&E) network known as Internet2.
Clemson peers with Internet2 in two locations: Atlanta, GA and Charlotte, NC. Fiber connections
to both Atlanta and Charlotte provide 110 Gbps and 10 Gbps worth of bandwidth, respectively [10].
Clemson maintains and protects its network through a variety of means, but notably through
a group known as the Cybersecurity Operations Center (CSOC). This center is responsible for
monitoring the university’s network traﬃc, while creating predictive analyses to avoid potential
attacks. The CSOC is equipped to monitor nearly all campus traﬃc, including all traﬃc that
reaches the core, and does so using a combination of NetFlow, Zeek (formerly Bro), and Splunk.
The CSOC is able to export these NetFlow records for further analysis. The network core can be
thought of as the place where all network traﬃc enters or leaves campus. This means that NetFlow
data is not collected for intracampus traﬃc.
The Clemson University campus network was chosen for analysis for a variety of reasons.
Its size, autonomous system status, and research usage make it a suitable target for traﬃc analysis
at an autonomous system level scale. Further, the availability of collected NetFlow records provide
an accurate glimpse into the data that would be available to an attacker looking to perform traﬃc
analysis on such a large network.

3.5.2

Limitations
The Clemson University campus network is built on a 100 Gbps backbone. NetFlow records,

at peak network traﬃc, are generated at a rate of nearly 70,000 flows/second. Further, due to
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software limitations, exporting the NetFlow records is a time consuming process. This limited any
collected samples to a maximum of 50,000 flow records. Considering these limitations, in order to
collect a wide range of data, NetFlow records were exported from non-peak time periods.
Nearly every device on Clemson’s campus network is provided a public IP address that is
protected by a firewall. Attempted attacks and vulnerability scans involving these IP addresses are
incredibly common. These attempted connections, due to the firewall, go unanswered, but are still
captured by CSOC’s Netflow collectors. For our purposes, these particular flows were not relevant,
and were therefore filtered out of the data sets provided. This allowed for more, relevant flow records
to be exported, given the 50,000 flow record limitation.

3.5.3

Netflow Samples
The first netflow data set requested was for all network traﬃc touching the campus network

core. The number of records that were made available were limited to 15,000 due to the amount
of time it took to export the data. The flow records were exported on October 12th, 2018 at 11:37
AM. The size of the first set of records was 1.9 MB.
Due to the limitation on the amount of flow records that could be exported, we decided to
focus on the data that we were most interested in. So for the next data set, we requested 50,000
HTTPS flows that traversed the campus network core. As mentioned, this type of boundary gives
a good look at traﬃc that must be routed by BGP between autonomous systems, and therefore
accurately represents network traﬃc that would be available to an attacker.
As mentioned, the second netflow data set contained all HTTPS sessions that crossed the
campus network boundary. It consisted of 50,000 flow records and was exported on October 25th,
2018 at 5:00 PM. The size of the data set ended up at 9 MB.
Apart from a few long lived flows, the majority of the records represent sessions that are
relatively short lived somewhere in the order of tens of seconds. This means that the data sets only
represent a small window of time. For the first data set, this window of time is around 5 minutes.
The second data set, although limited in the types of sessions collected, spans slightly longer at
around 20 minutes.
Each individual flow record contains the following fields: client host, server host, duration,
application, service summary, total traﬃc (bps), total bytes, total packets, start active time, client
bytes, client ratio (%), server bytes, first client port seen, and server port.
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3.5.4

Analysis
The initial analysis was performed on the first set of netflow records. A python script was

written to parse the flow records, remove outliers, and decorate the flows with public information
contained within a series of databases.
In order to smooth out some of the data and get a more accurate picture of the average
network flow in Clemsons network, outliers were removed from the data based on the total bytes
transmitted in a given flow.
Then, each flow was decorated with an autonomous system number (ASN) that corresponded
to the AS containing the destination IP address. In order to perform this step, pyasn [8] was used
to generate an IPASN data file using RIB information made available through Route Views [36]. It
should be noted that all of this information is publicly available. The IPASN data file consists of a
long list of IP prefix and ASN mappings, which are then used for eﬃcient lookups. An excerpt of
the IPASN data file used in our analysis can be seen in Listing 3.2.
Listing 3.2: Excerpt of an IPASN file
1

; IP - ASN32 - DAT file

2

; Original source : rib .20181019.2000. bz2

3

; Converted on

: Fri Oct 19 17:00:02 2018

4

; Prefixes - v4

: 775761

5

; Prefixes - v6

: 0

6

;

7

1.0.0.0/24

13335

8

1.0.4.0/22

56203

9

1.0.4.0/24

56203

10

...
After the flows were decorated with the destination’s globally advertised IP prefix and ASN,
the ipwhois [24] library was used to perform a whois lookup for each flow record. This provided the
ability to further decorate the flow record with a description of the AS a human readable identifier of
the owner of an AS. The geoip2 library and database were then used to decorate the flows with the
location information of the AS. This simple lookup is also made possible using whois information,
required for AS registration.
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Finally, the flows were aggregated based on the destination IP address, giving us a total
count of the number of flows for each destination. An example entry of these aggregated flow records
is shown in listing 3.3.
Listing 3.3: Example entry after decorating and aggregating flow records
1

index , count , ip , asn , asn_cidr , asn_description , latitude , longitude

2

3 ,67 ,31.13.69.0 ,32934 ,31.13.69.0/24 ," FACEBOOK - Facebook , Inc . , US
" ,38.6582 , -77.2497
The percentage of flows records by application type are shown in Figure 3.1. It should be
noted that the application type is not for each flow record is not guaranteed to be correct. The
Netflow exporter, in some cases, attempts to give an informed guess of the application type based
on the port numbers used. In the case of this data set, over half of the flow records come from DNS
requests and responses. Nearly a third of the flow records correspond to HTTPS connections. The
other 20% of flow records are produced from a mixture of ICMP, undefined UDP, HTTP, undefined
TCP, and others.
While looking at the percentage of flow records by application type shows DNS connections
far outnumbering other applications, Figure 3.2 paints a clearer picture of the amount of data
transmitted per application. In our data set, 68.5% of the total bytes transmitted were from HTTPS
flows. This is in contrast to the percentage of total bytes transmitted from DNS flows, which is
1.3%. This shows that while HTTPS traﬃc accounts for fewer flows, it accounts for most of the
data transmitted.
Looking at Figure 3.3, we can start to see how static IP addressing shares more information
than one would initially think. Up until now, we have looked only at traﬃc type and the amount
of data per type, which can be useful when planning a network. But this data doesn’t really tell
us anything directly about a network user. In Figure 3.3 however, we can see the top destinations
listed in terms of the AS details by the number of flows containing a destination within that AS.
The figure contains the top 10 destination ASes, led by Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Akamai.
In fact, the top 10 destination ASes for Clemson traﬃc in this data set are all owned by these 4
companies. The reason for this has already been discussed, but is primarily driven by the rise in
CDNs and cloud computing. Amazons AWS, Microsofts Azure, and Googles GCP are the three
largest public cloud providers in the world. Akamai is one of, if not the largest CDN provider in the
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Flows by Application
world. Therefore, it is of no surprise that these companies make up most of the flow destinations.
The location map in Figure 3.4 is another example of the information that can be gleaned
from simple flow records. Using the decorated location data mentioned earlier, we can plot out the
exact locations of every flow destination. In the case of the Clemson data set, we can see that every
destination was within the continental United States. We can also see the influence of the large
public cloud providers and CDNs, with much of the traﬃc ending in strategic points: Seattle, San
Francisco, Virginia, Atlanta, and Kansas City. These cities are desirable for their proximities to
large metropolitan areas, enabling low latency servicing of user requests. Even so, there are still a
large number of locations outside of these areas, showing that many of the destinations lie outside
these CDNs.
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of Total Bytes by Application
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Figure 3.3: Number of Flows per Organization
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Figure 3.4: Map of Server Locations

Table 3.1: Example DNS Query Results
URL
IP
CDN
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
nytimes.com
bbc.com
bbc.com
bbc.com
bbc.com
economist.com
economist.com
wsj.com
wsj.com
wsj.com
wsj.com
cnn.com
cnn.com
cnn.com
cnn.com

151.101.129.164
151.101.193.164
151.101.1.164
151.101.65.164
151.101.64.81
151.101.128.81
151.101.192.81
151.101.0.81
199.83.128.108
199.83.132.108
205.251.207.76
205.251.207.13
205.251.207.31
205.251.207.38
151.101.129.67
151.101.193.67
151.101.1.67
151.101.65.67
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Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Incapsula
Incapsula
AWS
AWS
AWS
AWS
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly
Fastly

Chapter 4

Architecture & Implementation
In this chapter, we introduce the TARN architecture at a high level, and then continue with
a deep dive into each individual segment. We start by introducing the network level architecture of
TARN, with the diﬀerent requirements for each deployment type. Then, the software architecture
is introduced. This section discusses the diﬀerent software components required for TARN.
The core idea behind TARN is dynamically announcing IP prefixes for a TARN enabled
network or service, which enables clients to access these services using random IP addresses. This
solution bears similarities to frequency-hopping spread spectrum, which pioneered a similar method
[33].

4.1

Internet Overview
In a typical network today, most hosts exist on a layer two, ethernet network. Each host in

this network maintains a MAC address that is used by other hosts to direct messages to the proper
destination. In this ethernet network, each message is known as a frame. And each frame contains a
source and destination MAC address that defines who the frame is coming from and who the frame
is going to. Ethernet frames are typically handled by a process known as forwarding in network
devices called switches. These switches, using the MAC addresses in the frames, will forward traﬃc
towards the correct destination. These layer two, ethernet networks are not suﬃcient, however.
More segmentation is needed, so IP networks are deployed.
In an IP network (commonly known as layer three), each host is given an IP address. These
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IP addresses, similar to MAC addresses, are used to route messages to their final destination. In the
IP layer, these messages are known as packets, and each packet contains a source and destination
IP address. The source IP address defines who the packet is coming from and the destination IP
address defines who the packet is destined for. This diﬀers slightly from from MAC addresses in that
the source and destination MAC addresses deal with the immediate next hops, whereas IP addresses
can define the ultimate source and destination hosts, even if there are multiple hops in between. IP
packets are handled through a process known as forwarding using network devices known as routers,
although, it should be mentioned that routing is also performed on the hosts themselves. There is
normally one router per IP network. Any hosts on the IP network, when sending packets to hosts
within the local area network (LAN), will simply route the packets directly to the host, after learning
its MAC address through ARP. If the packet is destined for a host outside the LAN, the packet will
first be routed to the network’s default router. It is then the router’s job to decide where the packet
should be sent next in order for it to move one step closer to its final destination, as specified in the
destination IP address. In a large network, there can be many layers of IP networks, each behind
their own gateway router. It is up to the network administrator to determine how to adequately
provision the network, separating a given address space into any number of subnets.
For any network to be accessible from the outside world, public IP addresses must be used.
Large organizations will typically apply for a contiguous set of IP addresses in order to provision
them as needed. These sets of addresses are known as IP routing prefixes. There are a fixed number
of public IP prefixes available for use, and they are managed by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA). This collection of routing prefixes, when assigned to an organization and put
under control of a single administrative entity, are known as an autonomous system (AS). Each AS
is given a unique autonomous system number (ASN) that is assigned by the IANA. The prefixes, in
order to be globally reachable, must be advertised globally. This is done using the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP).
BGP is a protocol used to globally advertise the prefixes owned by an AS [31]. It should
be noted that there are two types of BGP: internal and external. The one being discussed here is
external. The BGP protocol is used by BGP routers that typically sit on the edge of an AS. These
BGP routers communicate with other BGP routers on the same network, known as neighbors. Each
BGP router is responsible for advertising the routing prefixes owned by the AS that it resides in,
along with forwarding any advertisements sent to it from a neighbor to any other neighbors. BGP
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is a path vector protocol, which means that the full path of ASNs is maintained and dynamically
updated before an advertisement is forwarded. This is what allows BGP routers to build a global
route table of public routing prefixes.
These BGP routers often communicate over layer two connections at an Internet Exchange
Point (IXP).

4.2

Software Defined Networking
Software defined networking (SDN) is a critical piece of the TARN solution. It allows for

the direct control of selected traﬃc in the data plane, which is crucial in the implementation of a
network based solution. In a SDN, this control goes beyond traﬃc steering. The direct manipulation
of packet header information is also a welcomed addition to any tool attempting to obfuscate sensitive
information. The selection of only certain traﬃc is critical, as it prevents TARN from acting on any
traﬃc outside of what it is configured for. TARN is designed to operate only on IPv4 and IPv6
packets. The selection of only these packets is critical for TARN’s operation. The SDN controller
also provides a convenient space for the configuration and management of the TARN application.

4.2.1

OpenFlow
The OpenFlow protocol is used heavily in the TARN solution, however, any south bound

SDN protocol with suﬃcient IPv4 and IPv6 match and action capabilities could be used in its place.
In terms of OpenFlow, TARN specifically requires version 1.5. This version introduced IP mask
based matching, which is necessary for TARN to properly select traﬃc in a manner that is remotely
scalable. The specifics of how these OpenFlow matches and actions are used will be discussed in a
following section.

4.3

Transparency
The goal of a transparent anonymity solution is to provide the benefits of network anonymity

to clients who may not want to use application level solutions or who are unaware of such a need.
A fully transparent solution should require no interaction from an end user for that user to
reap the benefits of said solution. This is possible by providing the solution as a network service; one
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that can be managed by a network administrator. In this case of anonymity, this is advantageous for
a number of reasons. First, many users may be unaware of their need for anonymity. They might
not understand that their information may be visible to outside parties. Second, users may not
understand the anonymity needs of an organization. For a business or institution whose anonymity
needs are greater than a typical network, it may be critical that user traﬃc is kept anonymous,
even if the users of that network are unaware of such a requirement. Third, users may not have the
technical understanding to take advantage of existing, application level anonymity tools. Having a
transparent, network based anonymity service is a major boon for network administrators in that
it allows them to control the level of anonymity of any traﬃc in their network, without the need to
rely on network users.

4.4
4.4.1

IP Randomization
Choosing Random Addresses
When the initial packet of a TARN session reaches a TARN controlled switch, it is sent

to the controller, where the session is assigned a random IP address to be used until the session is
closed. How is this address chosen?
To start, all random IP address selection in a TARN network operates within the bounds
of whatever prefix pool has been assigned to that network. In other words, any random address
must be pulled from a designated prefix pool. Without this requirement, the rewritten traﬃc would
be unable to be routed back to the originating TARN network, assuming the traﬃc had not been
dropped first by a very confused BGP router. When a prefix pool has been properly assigned and
configured, it can then be used by any prefix mappings configured for the TARN network. These
prefix mappings are used to map a slice of a TARN network to some associated slice of the prefix
pool. This slice of the prefix pool, as defined by the prefix mapping, is the source of any random IP
address chosen for a TARN host in which the prefix mapping is associated. When the initial packet
of a TARN session is received by the controller, the associated prefix mapping for the TARN host is
retrieved. The external prefix, itself a part of the larger TARN prefix pool, is then used to select a
random IP address to be used for the duration of the session. A random number generator is used
to generate a random integer, which is used to create a random IP address. The external prefix, as
defined in the associated prefix mapping, is then applied to the random IP address in order to create
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the final random address, which should then be a part of external prefix. This ensures that the
random IP address is routable, assuming that the larger prefix pool has been properly advertised.
Depending on the size of the external prefix, generated random IP addresses are likely to
collide with other randomly generated IP addresses. In the case of these collisions, TARN must have
some other way of distinguishing between sessions beyond source and destination IP addresses. The
solution to this problem is discussed in Section 4.6.1.3 when describing how our TARN controller
implementation handles TARN traﬃc.

4.4.2

One-way vs. Two-way Randomization
In an ideal scenario, any connection will have, at each end, a TARN deployment. This will

ensure that both the source and destination IP addresses will be successfully randomized, maintaining the anonymity of both clients involved in the connection. However, in some cases, this is not
entirely necessary in order for TARN to operate successfully. It is possible for a single TARN deployment to maintain the anonymity of the client(s) behind it. We refer to this scenario as one-way
randomization, as compared to the ideal, known as two-way randomization.
4.4.2.1

One-way Randomization
One-way randomization means that, during a TARN connection, only one client is using

a randomized address. The other client’s address is not randomized, and is therefore unchanging
across multiple connections. Of course, this is only a feasible approach if the TARN client is initiating
the connection. This is a reasonable requirement as it is the same requirement imposed by stateful
firewalls. While useful, one-way randomization is mostly a by-product of single TARN deployments.
It provides some of the benefits of TARN, such as source IP randomization, without restricting
TARN users to only communicating with other TARN users. Unfortunately, with the destination IP
addresses not randomized, some information is still revealed about the TARN network as a whole.
4.4.2.2

Two-way Randomization
Two-way randomization means that both clients are using a randomized address during a

TARN connection. This means that, for any new connection between the same two clients, random
IP addresses will be chosen. This is only possible by having a TARN deployment on each side of the

30

connection to perform the necessary mappings. Two-way randomization provides the full anonymity
benefits of TARN, unlike one-way randomization, which is only able to provide a subset.

4.5

Network Architecture
In this section, we discuss the three diﬀerent network architectures that TARN can be

deployed in. Each architecture fits into one of the scopes of trust as defined in the previous section.
Also for each architecture, there are certain expectations about the network that surrounds it. These
network architectures do not exist on their own. In order for TARN to be eﬀective, multiple TARN
deployments are required. This is made easier due to the diﬀerent TARN deployment architectures
being interoperable with one another. For example, many client-based TARN deployments may
successfully interact with a single gateway-based TARN deployment.

4.5.1

Client-based
The client-based TARN deployment puts the focus squarely on the client. A diagram of

this architecture can be seen in Figure 4.2. It is assumed that a client-based deployment will
communicating with some other external TARN service, whose address is being randomized. It is
unlikely that client-based TARN deployments will exist on their own outside of any other deployment
of a diﬀerent architecture. This is mostly due to routing requirements. TARN requires either control
over an AS’s BGP routing or cooperation with an AS to advertise and withdraw any routes being
used by TARN, at a given interval. It is unlikely that a single client will ever have this kind of
access. This means that client-based TARN deployments would typically be used to access some
external service that is employing TARN.
The client requires that any TARN-enabled service that it accesses is routable through the
client’s local network. This means that the TARN service has advertised its public prefix using BGP
and that that advertisement has propagated to the client’s local gateway.
The TARN service should use BGP to advertise its public prefixes that will contain the
randomized IP addresses of its services. These prefixes will be known by the TARN client through
some predefined means.
All IP rewrites are performed before any traﬃc leaves the client and enters the local network.
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4.5.2

Gateway-based
The gateway-based TARN deployment is designed to sit on the edge of an autonomous

system, with all potential TARN-enabled traﬃc passing through it. A diagram of this architecture
can be seen in Figure 4.3. This architecture assumes that the client’s local network is not hostile. All
traﬃc that is configured to be randomized will be randomized before leaving the gateway. Likewise,
any traﬃc coming from an external TARN service will be rewritten by the TARN gateway before
entering the network.
4.5.2.1

Prefix Advertisement
A TARN gateway has the ability to advertise and withdraw BGP prefixes for the autonomous

system that sits behind it. This is necessary as TARN rotates the prefix space being used to assign
random IP addresses when randomizing traﬃc, which, as discussed earlier, is necessary to maintain
anonymity. Each TARN gateway will maintain a pool of prefixes that may be advertised. On a
prefix rotation, the new prefix will be advertised using a BGP update message. Any new TARN
connections will use random addresses assigned from the newly advertised prefix. After this update
has suﬃciently propagated and all previous TARN connections using the previous prefix space have
ended, the previous prefix will be withdrawn using another BGP update message.
4.5.2.2

Routing Requirements
As its name implies, the TARN gateway acts as a traditional campus gateway for an au-

tonomous system. This is because, in this architecture, TARN is intended to provide a certain level
of anonymity to the users within the network when that user traﬃc is viewed from outside of the
network. This means that in order for TARN to operate correctly, any user traﬃc that is to be
anonymized must pass through the TARN gateway when leaving the network. Clients may exist
within the same subnet as the TARN gateway, or more likely, they will exist in subnets behind a
router. Either way, traﬃc with a destination outside of the autonomous system must be routed
through the TARN gateway. After being rewritten, the traﬃc will be routed further by the TARN
gateway.
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4.5.2.3

IP Rewrites
As mentioned earlier, any TARN traﬃc will leaving or entering the network will be rewritten

at the TARN gateway. For traﬃc leaving the network, the network operator is required to specify
what traﬃc should be randomized. The specifics of this process will be discussed in a later section,
but it should be known that the network operator is able to specify any subset of the network traﬃc
to be rewritten by TARN.

4.5.3

SDX-based
The TARN SDX deployment is intended to sit in the Internet core, bridging multiple au-

tonomous systems, while providing IP layer anonymity services at scale. A diagram of this architecture can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Traditional SDX designs are often described as single-site and multi-site deployments, with
multi-site deployments typically giving users added freedom in how their traﬃc processed and routed
globally. As mentioned earlier, any TARN connection logically requires two sides working in unison
in each direction: one TARN deployment to randomize addresses when sending and another to
perform the reverse when receiving. The TARN SDX is no exception, however, it is not limited to a
multi-site deployment. When multiple TARN SDXs are deployed, traﬃc to be randomized is passed
through the initial SDX, randomized, forwarded to the second SDX, and derandomized. Of course,
this implies certain routing requirements that will be discussed later. For a single-site TARN SDX
deployment to work properly, any randomized TARN connection that the SDX is involved with must
be terminated at a separate TARN deployment. This could include any of the three architectures
described in this section.

4.6

Software Architecture
In this section, we discuss the diﬀerent software components that make up TARN. Many

of these components are consistent across the three TARN architectures, with the main diﬀerences
being in configuration. Any potential diﬀerences will be discussed.
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Figure 4.1: GENI TARN deployment

4.6.1

TARN Floodlight Controller
In the TARN software architecture, the controller can be considered the brain of the oper-

ations. It has many responsibilities, such as resource management, flow rule computation, configuration, etc. Each of these responsibilities will be discussed in detail.
The controller relies heavily on the OpenFlow protocol in order to program the data plane,
which in turn enables the IP rewrites that make TARN possible. The controller interacts with
the data plane using flow rules, which are defined by OpenFlow. Flow rules are computed by the
controller and programmed into the data plane on an OpenFlow switch, which will be discussed
later. These flow rules contain, at their most basic, matches and actions. A match defines what
network traﬃc that specific flow rule will operate on. There are a variety of matches that can be
defined, but as TARN only concerns itself with Layer 3 and Layer 4, only matches on source and
destination IP addresses and source and destination TCP/UDP ports are relevant. An action defines
what operations will be performed on network traﬃc that has been matched by the flow rule. Like
matches, there are a variety of actions that can be performed, but, for TARN, there are only a few
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Figure 4.2: TARN Client Network Architecture
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Figure 4.3: TARN Gateway Network Architecture
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Figure 4.4: TARN SDX Network Architecture

Figure 4.5: TARN SDX with NFV Scenario
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Table 4.1: REST APIs defined by the TARN Floodlight module
HTTP Method Description

API

/wm/tarn/config
/wm/tarn/mapping

/wm/tarn/session

GET
PUT
GET
PUT
DELETE
GET

Get the global configuration parameters
Set the global configuration parameters
Get the configured prefix mappings
Add a new prefix mapping
Delete a configured prefix mapping
Get all the TARN sessions

that are relevant.
4.6.1.1

TARN Management APIs
One of the core responsibilities of the TARN Floodlight controller is to act as a central

point of management for network administrators. In TARN’s case, a REST API was implemented
to facilitate this management. By using a REST API, the TARN controller is able to be configured
manually or programmatically. The Floodlight controller simplifies this process by providing a secure
REST server implementation, which it exposes as a Floodlight service. A Floodlight module, like
TARN, when depending on this service, is able to register REST API endpoint URIs and handlers
with the service. These handlers are configured to respond to multiple HTTP methods (GET, PUT,
POST, DELETE) as needed. The TARN REST APIs made available are shown in Table 4.1.
All global configuration parameters are handled under the /wm/tarn/config URI. Only one
parameter is currently exposed, which is the enable parameter. This allows the TARN module to
be enabled and disabled entirely, completely ignoring any configured prefix mappings and allowing
all traﬃc to pass through the module without being handled.
Prefix mapping configuration is handled under the /wm/tarn/mapping URI. Using an HTTP
PUT, a prefix mapping can be configured with an internal IP address and an external IP prefix.
Individual prefix mappings can be deleted using an HTTP DELETE while specifying the internal
IP address in the URI.
Finally, information about TARN sessions can be retrieved using the /wm/tarn/session
URI. Each session contains information such as the current status, IP protocol being used, and the
initial session direction. Sessions can be filtered by these values through the use of query strings.
This allows a client to view only the sessions that they are interested in, which becomes useful when
many TARN sessions have been created.
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4.6.1.2

Handling Non-TARN Traﬃc
While the long term vision of TARN would include the randomization of all traﬃc within

an associated network, this is not practical when the incremental deployment of TARN is required.
To compensate for this, the TARN Floodlight module is designed to handle network traﬃc that a
network administrator does not want to be randomized. Floodlight is equipped with existing modules
that provide equivalent functionality of traditional networks. One of these modules, the forwarding
module, leverages a host Floodlight services in order to gain a global view of the SDN it is controlling.
With this knowledge, it is able to make informed decisions about packet forwarding, while proactively
inserting flows along the path of its choosing, allowing any other traﬃc that matches on these newly
inserted flows to be forwarded properly through the network. Using Floodlight’s packet-handling
mechanism described earlier, the TARN module, when presented with a PacketIn message that
does not correspond with any configured prefix mappings, simply allows the PacketIn message to
be handed oﬀ to the forwarding module to be handled. This provides a convenient fallback for any
non-TARN connections.
4.6.1.3

Handling TARN Traﬃc
The TARN controller is, by nature, reactive. This means that it reacts to any unhandled

packets that reach any of the OpenFlow enabled switches by creating the necessary flow rules to
properly handle the rest of the packet flow. This is in contrast to a proactive controller, which
preemptively inserts all flow rules needed for the network to perform. The reactive nature of the
TARN controller is required, as the random external IP addresses necessitate that each TARN
enabled session must be handled slightly diﬀerently. The external address of any incoming TARN
traﬃc must be learned, which requires that the first packet in a TARN session must always be
handled by the controller.
The Floodlight controller, in which the TARN controller is based on, enlists the help of a
listener pattern to dispatch any received packets to the modules that are interested. When a packet
is received, it is copied and sent to each registered module using a callback mechanism. Included in
the callback is the OpenFlow message, a representation of the switch that the message was received
from, and some additional context. The TARN module is registered as one of these listeners in order
to properly handle any OpenFlow messages received.
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The message handling is done in a synchronous fashion, in which each registered listener
is called one by one, with each listener able to handle a message completely before the message is
sent to the next listener. This allows listeners to terminate the message handling pipeline, which
is useful when a decision has been made about a specific message and any further handling may
interfere with the decision. Because of this, it is natural that some listeners take priority over
others. Floodlight provides a mechanism for modules to request priority over other modules for
specific types of OpenFlow messages. In the case of the TARN module, it requires priority over the
Forwarding module for PacketIn messages. This is because TARN will make decisions about new
TARN sessions, sometimes inserting flow rules. If the Forwarding module is able to handle PacketIn
messages first, it may insert conflicting flow rules to handle the session before the TARN module is
able to.
When an OpenFlow message is first received by the TARN module, it is first determined
whether or not the service has been disabled. If the TARN service has been disabled, then the module
will allow the message to continue to be processed. If the service is enabled, the module will then
seek to determine what type of OpenFlow message has been received. The TARN module currently
handles two types of messages: PacketIn, which signifies that a table miss occurred for a packet on
a switch, and FlowRemoved, which signifies that flow entries have been removed from a switch. In
the case of a PacketIn message, it must first be determined whether the packet belongs to a TARN
device, or whether it should simply be handled by Forwarding, as described in Section 4.6.1.2. In
order to determine whether or not a packet belongs to a new TARN session, it is compared with the
configured prefix mappings. Both the source and the destination IP addresses of the packet must
be looked at, as one or both may have an associated prefix mapping. Each IP address looked at,
when comparing to a prefix mapping, is checked to see whether it falls within a configured internal
IP prefix or external IP prefix. If either the source or destination IP address is determined to be an
internal address, the new TARN session is considered to be outgoing, meaning it has not yet left the
scope of trust and still needs to be randomized. Likewise, if either IP address is determined to be
an external address, the new TARN session is considered to be incoming. This means that TARN
session has already been randomized by a separate TARN deployment, and must be learned by the
controller. It will then need to be rewritten into whatever internal IP address that was configured
by the network administrator.
After the packet is determined to belong to some incoming or outgoing TARN session, a
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new TarnSession object is built. During the creation of this object, if the session is determined
to be outgoing, meaning the packet contained internal IP addresses and needs to be randomized,
then a random IP address will be selected from within the configured external prefix for the source
and/or the destination IP address. This TarnSession object contains all the information needed in
order to build the necessary flow rules that will rewrite the TARN traﬃc whether to randomize or
derandomize.
In order to build the types of flow rules required to match on and rewrite TARN sessions,
OpenFlow 1.5 is required. As a reminder, OpenFlow flow rules are made up of matches and actions.
The configured match fields are used to select incoming traﬃc, which are then handed oﬀ to the
flow rule’s action. In terms of matches, the flow rules constructed by TARN are designed to be as
specific as possible. The match fields consist of the in port, the EtherType, the source IP address,
the destination IP address, and, if applicable, the IP protocol, along with the source port and
the destination port. This explicit matching of as many packet header characteristics as possible
prevents any issues that could be caused by collisions when selecting random IP addresses.

4.6.2

Switch
In the TARN architecture, the controller may be the brains, but the switch can be viewed as

the hands and feet. All TARN enabled traﬃc must pass through a switch in order to be randomized.
When deciding on what switch to use in the TARN architecture, the first question that
must be answered is whether the switch should be physical or virtual. There are many benefits
and drawbacks for each that need to be weighed. The greatest benefit to using a physical switch
is performance. It is able to handle packets at line-rate, in hardware, while only rarely having to
process packets in software. This benefit, however, leads to one of the greatest drawbacks: The type
of OpenFlow matches and actions required for TARN to operate are only contained within OpenFlow
1.5. Physical OpenFlow switch manufacturers have long been slow to keep up with newer versions
of OpenFlow. And those switches that do support OpenFlow 1.5 are either extremely expensive or
the OpenFlow 1.5 exclusive matches and actions are handled in software, which negates the original
benefit. Compare this to software switches, where every packet is processed in software by default.
This obviously means that a software switch will never surpass the peak performance of a hardware
switch. This chasm of performance between a physical switch and a software switch is, in fact, able
to be reduced. Many software switches make a clear distinction between userspace and kernel space.
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Userspace is inherently less performant than kernel spaces, as it has to deal with frequent interrupts
from the underlying operating system. In contrast, kernel space is very performant, and is therefore
the preferred space for packet handling in a software switch. Taking OVS as an example, flow rules
that are defined in userspace are converted into flow rules that can be installed in kernel space, where
packet handling is much faster. However, when there is a table miss in the kernel flow tables, the
packet must be copied into userspace where it is then handled, which likely results in more kernel
flow rules being installed. Software switches can further increase performance using specialized SDKs
that further optimize interaction with hardware. The most well known example of this technology is
the Intel DPDK. Because software switches can operate on top of nearly any hardware stack, there
are also much more portable than a physical switch. Physical switches can take multiple days to
properly install and configure, and require human intervention. Software switches can be installed
and configured automatically and as needed. This makes them much more well suited for scalability
as well.
One of the main reasons that OVS was chosen for the initial TARN implementation was
for its close connection with the Floodlight controller. Floodlight was designed with an OVSlike OpenFlow pipeline in mind, inserting all flow rules into table 0 by default. This made the
interconnection between the controller and the switch very simple from the beginning.
The Floodlight controller interacts with OVS over the OpenFlow control plane. This control
plane is setup during the initial OpenFlow handshake between the controller and the switch. In this
handshake, the switch is the first to initiate, with the controller responding to the switch’s attempts
to connect. This handshake provides the controller with the necessary details about the capabilities
of the switch, including the number of flow tables, the supported matches and actions, and the
supported OpenFlow version.
As discussed earlier, the TARN controller is preconfigured with a set of prefix mappings
corresponding to the network traﬃc that is being randomized by TARN. The switch, on startup,
contains only a single default flow rule in its flow table. When a to-be-randomized packet reaches
the switch, it fails to match on any flows, and is therefore copied and sent to the controller over the
control plane. The controller then determines whether the received packet corresponds to one of the
configured prefix mappings. If it does, a series of OpenFlow flow rules are then computed, built,
and dictated to the switch, which then inserts them into its flow table. This means that the next
to-be-randomized packet in the connection will match on one of these newly inserted flow rules and
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will have its source and/or destination address rewritten by the switch.
When setting up an OVS in a TARN deployment, there are certain parameters that must be
configured. The first parameter is the IP address of the controller. This allows the OVS to initiate
the OpenFlow handshake required for setting up the control plane connection. It should be noted
that the only network requirement for the switch and controller is that each component must be
reachable by the other. This means that, in theory, the controller may be deployed anywhere in
the world, as long as it is able to communicate with the switch. In practice, a large latency in the
control plane should be avoided, as it can greatly deteriorate the network performance, especially in
table-miss scenarios where a packet is sent to the controller in order that it can make a decision. The
second parameter that must be configured is the fail mode of the OVS. The options are provided are
standalone and secure. In standalone mode, when the control plane connection between the switch
and the controller is interrupted, the switch will default to traditional switching.

4.6.3

Router
A critical component of the TARN architecture is the router. It is necessary in order to

route any TARN traﬃc entering and leaving an AS. It also acts as the BGP speaker, sending out
any BGP updates needed to advertise and withdraw any TARN prefixes.
In a simplified TARN deployment, the router takes on two distinct roles: an IP router that
forwards any TARN traﬃc entering or leaving a TARN enabled network and a BGP speaker that
is responsible for any BGP communication necessary to periodically advertise and withdraw any
TARN prefixes. While combining these two functions into a single router simplifies deployment, it
is not a strict requirement. The BGP speaker can be broken out into its own deployment, separate
from the router used to forward traﬃc into and out of the network.
The choice to use the PEERING testbed played a significant role in the selection of a software
router to use in the TARN deployments. In order to easily communicate with the PEERING pointsof-presence, a command line based client was built by the PEERING team that is used to easily
connect to and leverage the points-of-presence. This client uses the BIRD software router.
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4.7
4.7.1

Deployments
Virtual Deployment
Because of the scale at which it operates and its normally mission critical nature, working

with BGP can oftentimes be very diﬃcult. This was especially true in the early development of
TARN. As the TARN architecture was forming, it became readily apparent that some type of
virtual deployment was necessary for rapid prototyping, while also providing a safe space for BGP
research, away from any real, mission critical BGP routers. A virtual deployment was also needed
in order to perform BGP research without the need for IP prefix allotments, which are necessary
when performing BGP updates on the Internet.
One common tool for SDN researchers has been the Mininet network virtualization tool
[6]. Mininet allows for complex networks to be created and run on a single machine. Mininet also
provides a python API, allowing for these network topologies to be scripted. One of the limitations
of Mininet is a lack of isolation of host filesystems and processes. In an eﬀort to remedy this, the
MiniNExT tool was developed [32]. MiniNExT provides greater host isolation by leveraging PID
namespaces, UTS namespaces, and improved mount namespaces. This allows for more complex
services to be run within virtualized hosts, such as Quagga, BIRD, and OpenVPN. In our virtual
deployment, version 1.4.0 of MiniNExT was used, which itself required Mininet version 2.1.0.
In order to deterministically build a VM with the necessary dependencies, particularly one
that could be deployed easily, the VM management tool Vagrant was used [25]. Using Vagrant, an
Ubuntu 14.04 VM was built with MiniNExT 1.4.0, Mininet 2.1.0, and OVS 2.8.1. This VM was
uploaded to Vagrant’s cloud hosting service. A Vagrantfile referencing this hosted VM was placed
in the root TARN project.
By using this combination of Vagrant and MiniNExT, python scripts were written containing various BGP topologies that could be run at will inside a virtualized environment. Virtualized
hosts were configured to run the TARN controller, others configured to run OVS, and other hosts
configured to run Quagga. This allowed for rapid development and verification of TARN topologies,
without the need for public prefixes or access to BGP routers. It also provided a convenient mechanism for running TARN demos. The deployment guide for the virtual deployment can be found in
Appendix A.
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4.7.2

GENI and PEERING Deployment

Controller

Both the client side and server side contain an instance of the TARN controller. The

TARN controller is a modified version of the Floodlight open source controller. Each Floodlight
node is a GENI Xen VM and running Ubuntu 16.04. In order for TARN to recognize any potential
TARN sessions, the controller must first be configured with mappings that contain the IP address
of the TARN host, and the current external prefix assigned to that TARN host. On the client side
TARN controller, the configured prefix mapping is 20.0.0.1 → 184.164.241.0/24. On the server side
TARN controller, the configured prefix mapping is 20.0.0.1 → 184.164.241.0/24.
Switch

Open vSwitch is used on both sides of the topology in order to facilitate the packet header

rewrites during any TARN sessions. Version 2.8.1 is used due to its support of IP rewriting using
subnet masks. Each OVS node is a GENI Xen VM and running Ubuntu 16.04.
Router

In this setup, both sides contain a router that serves two purposes: 1) Act as a BGP

router by peering with an IXP and announcing and withdrawing IP prefixes. 2) Forward ingress
traﬃc destined for any advertised prefixes into the local network and, conversely, forward any egress
traﬃc out of the local network.
Because each router must handle an enormous amount of BGP messages, GENI raw PCs
are used instead of VMs. This provides at least 48 GB of memory and 24 CPUs on each node. Each
router is running Ubuntu 16.04.
The Bird Internet Routing Daemon (BIRD) version 1.5.0 is used to do all of the BGP
routing.
PEERING

The PEERING testbed is used in order to gain a BGP presence at IXPs around

the world. In this specific experiment, the PEERING points of presence used are the Amsterdam
location for the client side router and the Seattle location for the server side router. These points
of presence were chosen for their proximity to the GENI aggregates used in the experiment. We
were given the 184.164.240.0/22 prefix range to use in our experiment, giving us a total of 4 /24
prefixes that we were able to announce and withdraw using BGP. On the client side, we used the
prefix 184.164.240.0/24 to assign addresses to the local network. Upon announcing that prefix using
the client side BIRD router, the client became publicly routable. On the server side, the prefix
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184.164.243.0/24 was used to assign addresses to the local network.
Client

In this experiment, the client is responsible for retrieving the TARN enabled website from

the server on the other side of the topology. The client is a GENI Xen VM running Ubuntu 16.04.
In order to simulate an actual user navigating to a web page in a browser, wget is used. By using
the –page-requisites flag, any files that are necessary to render the web page properly, like images
or ads, are also downloaded.
Server

It is important in our experiments to test TARN using preexisting, real-world websites. The

problem is that in order for TARN to work properly, the web server that is hosting the desired service
must be behind a TARN instance so that the necessary rewrites can be performed. Furthermore,
it is typically the server side’s responsibility to make any necessary BGP announcements of any
external prefixes used. A proxy server can be used to circumvent these issues.
In this experiment, the server is acting as a typical web server, but will instead proxy any
requests from the client to an actual web server. This allows us in eﬀect to place any existing web
site behind TARN.
The sever is running on a GENI Xen VM with Ubuntu 16.04. In order to perform the
proxying, Tinyproxy version 1.8.3 is used.

4.7.3

SDX Deployment Scenario
Figure 4.5 illustrates one implementation strategy for the SDX-based TARN. In the figure,

two separate SDXs are shown. Each SDX contains a controller, a switching fabric, and a TARN
NFV. Attached to SDX A is the Clemson University AS and attached to SDX B is the New York
Times AS.
The TARN NFV within each SDX contains a VM for each TARN enabled service. In our
example, the NYT will have a VM within each TARN NFV at each SDX to perform any necessary
rewrites.
From here, course-grained flow rules inserted by the SDX controller will match on any traﬃc
going to or coming from a TARN enabled address. This traﬃc will be funneled into the TARN NFV
to perform any necessary rewrites.
In this example, the New York Times has requested that its service be TARN enabled. This
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means that any NYT traﬃc between SDXs will be randomized.
In our example SDX setup, we will assume that a client from within the Clemson AS is
wanting to access the NYT. Because the Clemson AS is a participant at SDX A, our client’s request
will travel from the Clemson AS into the SDX. Upon reaching the SDX, course-grained flow rules,
inserted by the SDX controller, will forward the request into the TARN NFV. The TARN NFV
will first check if the source address of the request corresponds to any specific TARN service. In
our case, it will not, as the Clemson AS has not requested that its traﬃc be TARN enabled. The
TARN NFV will then check if the destination address corresponds to a TARN service. In this case,
the destination belongs to the TARN enabled NYT. The TARN NFV will then forward this traﬃc
through the NYT VM, where the destination IP will be rewritten to an external address. At this
point all the necessary rewrites have occurred and the request can then be continue its trek to SDX
B.
As our request enters into SDX B, a very similar process will occur. Course-grained flow
rules will direct any TARN traﬃc into the TARN NFV in order for any necessary rewrites to be
performed.

4.8

Evaluation
In order to demonstrate the anonymity features of TARN, the randomization algorithm

was applied to the second netflow data set described in Section 3.5. As a reminder, this data set
contained 50,000 HTTPS sessions collected in Clemson’s core campus network. This randomization demonstration was performed using only the sessions originating from hosts within Clemsons
130.127.0.0/16 IP subnet. The control data is shown in Table 4.2. After filtering the data set for
the flow records originating in the targeted subnet, we are left with 28,279 sessions. These sessions
originate from 2,564 unique host IP addresses within the 130.127.0.0/16 subnet. By dividing the
number of unique IP addresses by the total number of sessions, this leaves us with a diversity ratio of
0.091. Finally, the distribution of the number of sessions per unique IP address displayed a standard
deviation of 26.147. A graph of the control client distribution can be seen in Figure 4.6.
The randomization of the original data set was performed three times, increasing the size of
the IP prefix each iteration. The subnet sizes of /24, /16, and /12 were chosen as a smaller, equal,
and larger option compared to Clemsons /16 subnet.
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Feature
Unique IP Addresses
Number of Sessions
Diversity Ratio
Standard Deviation

Table 4.2: Anonymity features
Control TARN (/24) TARN (/16) TARN (/12)
2564
28279
0.091
26.147

256
28279
0.009
10.248

22918
28279
0.81
0.495

27907
28279
0.987
0.115

Starting with the smallest subnet, there are a few notable comparisons to the control. The
number of unique IP addresses, as expected, is nearly an order of magnitude less than the control
2,564 vs. 256. Given that the number of sessions remains constant, this means that the diversity
ratio actually decreases with a smaller subnet, from 0.091 to 0.009. This would seem to imply that
anonymity has been reduced. However, the standard deviation has greatly reduced down to 10.248.
Looking at the graph of the client distribution in Figure 4.7 and comparing it to the control, we can
see that the randomized distribution has flattened significantly from the nearly exponential control
distribution.
Moving on to the equal sized external subnet, the first thing to notice is that, while technically sharing the same amount of possible addresses, the randomized sessions contain significantly
more unique IP addresses than the control 22,918 vs. 2,564. This leads to a huge jump in the
diversity ratio to 0.81. The standard deviation has also crossed below one, down to 0.495. Looking
at the distribution in Figure 4.8 shows an even flatter distribution, with most of the unique IP
addresses only being used once and none being used more than five times.
Finally, the largest subnet predictably yielded the greatest anonymity features. Due to its
larger set of addresses, there were fewer repeat addresses used. In the flow data randomized with the
largest external prefix, there were 27,907 unique IP addresses, leading to a diversity ratio of 0.987.
This also led to a standard deviation of 0.115. Looking at the distribution in Figure 4.9, we can see
that nearly every IP address was used only once, with none being used more than three times.
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Figure 4.6: Client IP Address Distribution
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Figure 4.7: Randomized Client IP Address Distribution Using Smaller Prefix Size
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Figure 4.8: Randomized Client IP Address Distribution Using Equal Prefix Size
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Figure 4.9: Randomized Client IP Address Distribution Using Larger Prefix Size
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Chapter 5

Scalability
5.1

Bottlenecks
The TARN architecture introduced in section 4.5 is suﬃcient for providing layer 3 anonymity.

However, there are numerous bottlenecks in the network and software portions of the architecture.
These bottlenecks are likely not noticeable in scenarios with few TARN sessions, but in higher traﬃc
environments, especially at an autonomous system scale, they could be crippling. In this section, we
will introduce the diﬀerent possible bottlenecks in the TARN architecture, discussing each behavior
in diﬀerent scenarios. In later sections, we will introduce possible solutions or workarounds to each
bottleneck discussed.

5.2
5.2.1

VSwitch
Flow Table Exhaustion
Any OpenFlow compatible switch is required to have at least one flow table [35]. The size

of these flow tables are highly dependent on the type of switch. For a software switch, the flow table
size is typically limited by the amount of random access memory (RAM) available to the switch.
RAM is fairly inexpensive, which means that a software switch’s flow table size can reach into
the millions. For hardware switches, where the flow table is likely stored in some type of ternary
content-addressable memory (TCAM), a flow table size is typically much smaller. In hardware
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switches, flow rules with very simple matches, such as destination MAC address or destination IP
address, can be stored in the forwarding information base (FIB). More complicated flow rules, like
those used in TARN, must be stored in the TCAM. TCAM is much more expensive than RAM
and produces much more heat that must be dissipated. For this reason, the amount of TCAM
available in a hardware switch is minimal. A traditional hardware switch is able to store around
ten thousand flow rules in its TCAM. When a flow table has reached its maximum capacity, flow
table exhaustion has occurred. Regardless of the type of OpenFlow switch being used, flow table
exhaustion is a concern. As mentioned in section 4.6.2, TARN relies on virtual switches instead of
hardware switches. Because of this, the discussion surrounding this issue will stay within the context
of virtual switches.
A TARN gateway deployed at the edge of an autonomous system is especially vulnerable to
this problem. At its peak, the Clemson netflow collector gathers between 40,000 and 50,000 flows
per second. If each of these flows were TARN enabled, the flow table of the TARN switch would
quickly surpass a million entries. Using our Clemson netflow dataset as an example, looking at
a capture of 50,000 outgoing HTTPS flows, spanning roughly 5 minutes, the average duration of
HTTPS sessions was 111 seconds. The fact that most of the HTTPS flows remain active for nearly
two minutes exacerbates this problem even more.
A TARN SDX deployment is even more at risk. Even smaller exchange points peer with
dozens of autonomous systems, handling tens of gigabits of data per second.
To handle flow table exhaustion specifically, there are a number of possible solutions, but
one in particular that will be discussed – prefix-only rewrites. On their own, this solution does not
completely prevent the flow table exhaustion issue, but it is capable of reducing the number of flows
required, allowing TARN to scale to a suitable level.
Prefix-only Rewrites

Prefix-only rewrites seek to limit the number of flow rules inserted by

restricting IP rewrites to prefixes only. With prefix-only rewrites, an entire IP prefix will be matched
on and rewritten with a another IP prefix. This is in contrast to full IP matches and rewrites where,
for each TARN session, a random IP address is chosen to rewrite to. Using prefix-only rewrites, the
number of flow rules needed to randomize traﬃc is greatly reduced. Without prefix-only rewrites,
up to two flow rules are needed for each TARN session. With prefix-only rewrites, two flow rules
are suﬃcient for an entire subnet’s worth of TARN sessions.
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In chapter 3, we showed that IP layer anonymity is compromised as long as publicly advertised IP prefixes are coupled with autonomous systems. Prefix-only rewrites still provide this
decoupling, with the diﬀerence being a client’s host address is untouched while its network address
is rewritten. As an example, a client with IP address 10.0.0.1/16 may be rewritten to 1.2.3.4/16
in a traditional TARN setup. With prefix-only rewrites, however, the host address would remain
untouched, and 10.0.0.1/16 would be rewritten to 1.2.0.1/16.
One assumption when performing prefix-only rewrites is that all traﬃc in an associated
prefix is TARN enabled. The flow rules used for prefix-only rewrites are intentionally broad in order
to minimize the number of flows needed. It would be possible, however, for a network administrator
to selectively disable specific IP addresses, preventing them from being randomized. This would be
made possible by inserting flow rules of a higher priority than the TARN flow rules, that match on
specific IP addresses and perform some other desired action.
Another assumption is that, for each IP prefix being rewritten, a suﬃciently large enough
prefix is available for TARN to use to rewrite to. For example, if a /16 subnet is being randomized,
while TARN only has a /24 subnet available to rewrite to, 8 bits of IP address information will be
lost, or, in this example, 65,280 addresses.

5.3

Controller
One of the earliest complaints of software defined networking was the introduction of a single

point of failure into the network in the form of the SDN controller. This concern is not lost in the
TARN architecture and must be accounted for.
Packet-In Handling

One of the major responsibilities of any SDN controller is decision making

based on certain network events or network packets. The TARN controller is reactive in nature,
meaning responds to and handles OpenFlow packet-in messages. These packet-in messages are sent
to the controller by an OpenFlow switch during a table miss event, which occurs when a packet fails
to match on any flow rule in the switch’s flow table. This allows the controller to respond, making
decisions on how to handle the packet and, using flow rule insertions, any subsequent packets.
With TARN, flow rules are not computed and inserted until a packet-in message is received by the
controller. This presents a scalability problem in TARN deployments, such as a TARN gateway or
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TARN SDX, where there is potential for the controller to have to handle thousands of packet-in
messages per second.

5.4

Throughput Evaluation
In order to understand the potential overhead added to TARN traﬃc, a simple data transfer

was performed both with and without TARN.

5.4.1

Traﬃc Generation
The iperf utility was used to generate TCP traﬃc to be randomized by TARN. Iperf was

chosen for multiple reasons. It provided the control needed to ensure enough data was transferred
in each connection and, due to its client/server layout, provided the control needed to perform
throughput tests between diﬀerent resources. Most importantly, iperf is designed to fully saturate
the network pipe with TCP traﬃc. For each test, iperf was run using the -n flag, which allows a user
to specify how many bytes should be transferred in the iperf connection before completing. For each
data transfer, 1GB of data was transferred. The primary reason such a large amount was chosen was
due to the fact that GENI and PEERING are shared resources, with no real bandwidth guarantees.
By transferring a larger amount, we reduced the potential impact of fluctuations in bandwidth due
to this resource sharing.

5.4.2

Experimental Setup
The iperf data transfers were performed in two locations. The first location was between the

client and server VMs, with the iperf client being run on the client VM and the iperf server being
run on the server VM. Two types of data transfers were performed in this location; one data transfer
with TARN enabled and another data transfer with TARN disabled. In order to perform the data
transfer with TARN disabled, each OVS was configured in standalone mode and the TARN controller
configuration was removed. This resulted in each OVS falling back to traditional forwarding. The
second location in which the data transfer experiment was performed was between the two vswitch
VMs. In that experiment, the iperf client was run on the client-side vswitch VM and the iperf server
was run on the server-side vswitch VM. By running iperf between the two vswitch VMs, OVS was
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bypassed entirely, resulting in TARN being bypassed as well, meaning that particular experiment
was not TARN enabled.

5.4.3

Results
The throughput results of the data transfers can be found in figure 5.1. From client to

server, with TARN enabled, the throughput was measured at 19.1 Mbps. The same data transfer,
performed with TARN disabled, was measured at 19.0 Mbps. Finally, performing the same data
transfer again, but from vswitch to vswitch instead of client to server, the throughput was measured
at 18.9 Mbps.
Given the results, TARN does not appear to add any noticeable overhead when performing
a simple data transfer. The performance is likely aided by the simple data transfer mechanism
being used, resulting in a single TARN connection, which means the controller is only having to
handle a single packet before installing flow rules. It should also be noted that the controller in this
experiment is operating under ideal conditions, only having to handle a single TARN connection at
a time.
The results seem to be slightly counter-intuitive in that the TARN enabled transfers resulted
in a higher throughput as compared to the non TARN enabled transfers, considering the TARN
enabled transfers require additional work to be performed. The vswitch to vswitch results add to
this sentiment, having the worst throughput results. The explanation likely lies in the fact that GENI
and PEERING provide access to shared resources which, depending on the load, oﬀer fluctuating
performance.
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19.1

Throughput (Mbps)

19.0

19.0

18.9

18.8

With Tarn

Without Tarn
Figure 5.1: Throughput Results
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Ovs to Ovs

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Work
Traﬃc analysis is a fundamental reality for today’s internet user. Whether benevolent or
malicious, technological advances are making it easier for entities to collect information about the
users of a given network. This reality requires opposing advances in network design and security in
order to help users maintain their right to privacy and anonymity.
We have introduced the TARN architecture that seeks to decouple IP prefixes from large
networks, thereby removing the ability to target a network through the use of static IP rules. We
have also shown how BGP can leveraged to manage these pools of IP prefixes in today’s networks.
An SDX-based architecture was introduced to show how this IP prefix management may be done in
the future; providing distributed control and prefix rotation without the churn that BGP can cause
to global routing tables. These approaches make it suﬃciently diﬃcult for traﬃc analysis operators
to maintain their sights on specific targets and, in eﬀect, create networks that are resistant to some
of the more common forms of traﬃc analysis.
We have also introduced a proof-of-concept in order to show the feasibility of this solution.
A floodlight-based TARN controller was implemented. This controller, with the help of OVS and
Bird, is able to be deployed and operated using the TARN gateway architecture. This proof-ofconcept was deployed in multiple environments: in the GENI and PEERING testbeds, and within
the campus network at Clemson University.
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Appendix A
A.1

TARN Simulation Deployment

Intro
Why a simulated deployment? TARN relies extensively on BGP in order to perform the

routing necessary for it to work properly. In our testing environment, we make extensive use of
GENI and the PEERING testbed. As we all know, it’s easy enough to provide an rspec for users
to load into GENI, allowing them to bring up a topology in seconds. Unfortunately, this is not
the case with PEERING. Because BGP is so crucial to global routing, Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs) are understandably cautious when it comes to researchers doing any sort of BGP experiments.
This means that the folks at PEERING, who have partnered with IXPs to allow such experiments,
also have more stringent requirements: certificates, keys, and prefix assignments, all of which can
only be given after a proposal has been accepted. We know that it’s impractical to require that
anyone wanting to run TARN have go through this proposal process, so we created a Mininet based
environment to run some simple examples in!

A.2

Prerequisites

1. Download and install VirtualBox.
2. Download and install Vagrant, a virtual machine environment manager.

A.3

Installing TARN

1. Download the project: wget https://github.com/geddings/TARN/releases/download/v1.1.1/TARN-1.1.1.zip
2. Unzip the project: unzip TARN-1.1.1.zip
3. Change directories into the unzipped project: cd TARN-1.1.1
4. Start the vagrant build process: vagrant up

A.4

Running TARN
Running TARN while simultaneously viewing the IP rewrites will require at least 2 terminal

windows. The following commands assume that you are in the TARN-1.1.1 directory.
For One-way Randomization
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1. In the first terminal window, run the following command to start the one-way randomization example: vagrant ssh -c \sudo python ./TARN/examples/oneway.py" ##### For
Two-way Randomization
2. In the first terminal window, run the following command to start the one-way randomization
example: vagrant ssh -c \sudo python ./TARN/examples/twoway.py"
3. You should now be dropped into the Mininet CLI. From here, run the following command: h1
ping h2
4. In the second terminal window, run the following command to view the “internal” traﬃc:
vagrant ssh -c \sudo tcpdump -i s1-eth1 -n icmp"
• This command will show you what the traﬃc will look like inside any trusted networks.
These IPs should never change. They will always be 10.0.0.1 and 50.0.0.1.
5. Now, also in the second terminal window, run the following command to view the “external”
traﬃc: vagrant ssh -c \sudo tcpdump -i s1-eth2 -n icmp"
• This command will show you what the traﬃc will look like inside any untrusted networks.
These IPs will change for each new session and will be chosen from external prefixes
80.0.0.0/16 and (if running the two-way example) 40.0.0.0/24.

A.5

Stopping and Uninstalling TARN

1. In the first terminal window, in the Mininet CLI, type: exit
2. In the second terminal window, kill the tcpdump with: ctrl+c
3. From the TARN directory, run the following command to remove the TARN vagrant VM:
vagrant destroy

A.6

FAQ
When running the tcpdump command it tells me “No such device exists”.

The

tcpdump command can only be run while the example is already running. Start the example first
and, in another terminal window, run the tcpdump command.
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Vagrant is asking me for a password.

If vagrant asks you for a password, the default

password is vagrant
What is an “internal” address?

An internal address is the IP address in a packet

header before it is rewritten by TARN. By definition, an internal IP should only be able to be seen
in trusted networks. I.E Before the TARN rewrites on the client-side and after the TARN rewrites
on the server-side. The IPs will go from internal -> TARN -> external -> TARN -> internal.
What is an “external” address?

An external address is the IP address in a packet

header after it is rewritten by TARN. An external IP is the IP that should be seen in untrusted
networks, or over the public internet. External address should be seen after the TARN rewrites on
the client-side and before TARN rewrites on the server-side. The IPs will go from internal -> TARN
-> external -> TARN -> internal.

A.7

TLDR;

wget https://github.com/geddings/TARN/releases/download/v1.1.1/TARN-1.1.1.zip
unzip TARN-1.1.1.zip
cd TARN-1.1.1
vagrant up
vagrant ssh -c "sudo python ./TARN/examples/oneway.py"

A.8

Questions
Please email Geddings Barrineau at cbarrin@g.clemson.edu with any questions!
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